

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION**

**JAMAL VICKERS,** §  
                          §  
                          **PLAINTIFF,** §  
                          §  
                          §  
v.                      §  
                          **CIVIL CASE No. 3:18-cv-3213-L-BK**  
                          §  
                          §  
**DOCTOR GEORAY,** §  
                          §  
                          **DEFENDANT.**     §

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION  
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 636\(b\)](#) and *Special Order 3*, this case was referred to the United States magistrate judge for judicial screening. The Court granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis*, but did not issue process. Upon review of the relevant pleadings and applicable law, this case should be summarily **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** as frivolous.

**I. BACKGROUND**

On December 6, 2018, Plaintiff Jamal Vickers filed a *pro se* *Complaint* against Doctor Georay. [Doc. 3 at 1](#). The complaint is difficult to decipher, replete with misspellings and grammatical errors, and plainly nonsensical. In it he states, "I am here to the attoritiy of secirtey . . . to present to the courst a action of . . . falseoffcation . . ." [Doc. 3 at 1](#). Vickers further avers that Georay "intennly file a 20392001 by falseafly the office of Lamar Distrif Courts penele code 319862019466 section 2 on the behave on a major crime . . ." [Doc. 3 at 1](#).

**II. ANALYSIS**

Because Plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*, his complaint is subject to screening under [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(e\)\(2\)\(B\)](#). That statute provides for the *sua sponte* dismissal of a complaint if the Court finds that it (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous when it is based on an indisputable meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are “clearly ‘baseless.’” *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). The latter category encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” scenarios, or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” *Id.* at 33.

The Court must always liberally construe pleadings filed by *pro se* litigants. *See Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting *pro se* pleadings “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); *Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)* (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Even under this most liberal construction, however, Vickers’ apparent claims are legally and factually frivolous.

Vickers’ claims lack an arguable basis in law, and he has presented no supporting legal authority for the claims he asserts. Moreover, his factual contentions are clearly baseless and woefully inadequate to support any cognizable claim. *See Denton*, 504 U.S. at 33. Finally, his allegations appear irrational and incredible. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.


### **III. LEAVE TO AMEND**

Ordinarily, a *pro se* plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint prior to dismissal. However, leave to amend is not required when plaintiff “has already pleaded his ‘best case.’” *Brewster v. Dretke*, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). As discussed herein, Vickers’ apparent claims are fatally infirm. Based on the most deferential review of his complaint, it is

highly unlikely that, given the opportunity, he could allege cogent and viable legal claims. Thus, the Court concludes that granting leave to amend under these circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this action should be summarily **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** as frivolous. *See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).*  
**SO RECOMMENDED,** January 9, 2019.



RENEE HARRIS TOLIVER  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

#### INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).* To be specific, an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)* (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).